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INTRODUCfION 
c 
This paper compares two large household budget samples, of 
about 24.000 observations each, for a population of approximately 10 
million households occupying private housing: the Encuestas de 
Presupuestos Familiares (EPF from here on) for 1973-74 and 1980-81, 
collected by the Spanish Instituto Nacional de Estadfstica. 
Ruiz-Castillo (1987) measured relative money inequality and 
poverty in Spain using the 1980-81 EPF. Subsequently, Bosch, Escribano, 
and Sanchez (1989) measured the same phenomena for the 1973-74 
distribution following identical procedures, and established the pertinent
c comparisons. At the national level, their main finding was that "the 
Spanish society has experienced a slight increase in mean per capita total 
expenditure, ..., and such an increase has been distributed so that it has led 
to a reduction in the inequality between the Autonomous Communities, 
as well as a reduction of the inequality for the country as a whole". 
However, the two money distributions being compared belong to a 
period of high inflation: according to official estimates, the Spanish Indice 
de Precios de Consumo increased by a factor of 5,6 from 1973 to July of 1985, 
the last month of the index system based in 1976. What about the 
distributional impact of the changes in relative prices between these two 
dates? 
Abadia (1986a) has studied the evolution of aggregate price indices 
from 1976 to 1981 for different household types. Using true cost-of-living 
indices, based on the estimation of a linear expenditure demand system, 
Abadia (l986b, 1987) found that inflation during the period 1976-1985 had 
been biased against small households and those with greater total 
expenditure. 
Given these results, the purpose of this paper is twofold: 1) toc 
determine the importance of changes in relative prices, measured through 
household specific price indices, on the evolution of measured inequality 
from 1973-74 to 1984; and 2) to study the implications of such changes 
when we consider relevant partitions of the population. 
The main finding is that the improvement in real inequality is 
considerably larger than the improvement in money inequality. However, 
this qualitative result has to be understood and evaluated in the light of 
the following research decisions in many fronts: 
c 
- we have chosen household total expenditures, net of the 
acquisition of certain durables, as the best variable to represent the 
household's standard of living; 
- we have taken the person as the unit of analysis, and we have 
c considered the distributions which assign to each person the 'equivalent' 
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total expenditure of the household to which she belongs, obtained with 
the help of a variety of equivalence scales; 
- in recognition of the index number problem inherent in 
comparisons over time, we have estimated the change in real inequality 
at the time both surveys were taken, in 1973-74 and 1980-81, as well as in 
the middle and outside this period, in the years 1978 and 1984, respectively; 
- to express the two original distributions in money units of the 
time periods just mentioned, we have used household specific statistical 
price indices rather than true cost-of-living indices; 
- we have measured only relative inequality by means of the 
General Entropy family of additively decomposable inequality indices. 
As we will see, at the national level the central result is reasonably 
robust to variations in the value judgements used. However, to complete 
this approach which pools all household types into a single distribution, 
we have explored also the inequality experienced by households of the 
same size which are presumed to have comparable needs. 
Moreover, given the heterogeneity in a population of a country as 
large and complex as Spain, we have performed other disaggregated 
analysis to study which groups of the population experienced gains or 
losses in real inequality, as well as the role of different characteristics in 
explaining total inequality. We present results for the partitions by 
Autonomous Community, municipality size, and educational attainment 
of the household head. Special attention has been paid to measurement 
procedures independent of the equivalence scale used. 
Methodologically, this is a paper in the area of applied descriptive 
statistics. As a matter of fact, our main interest is in carefully examining 
how far we can go in establishing normative conclusions with regard to 
the evolution of inequality over time within an explicit microeconomic 
framework, making use of statistical methods which do not need either 
too specific assumptions about individual preferences, or their recovery by 
means of complex and expensive econometric methods. 
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. The first section 
summarizes the conceptual framework and the difficulties involved in 
the rigorous comparison of income distributions which pertain to 
different groups of people confronting different price structures. The 
second section provides a justification for the procedures we favor, as well 
as the details of their empirical implementation. The third section 
contains the empirical results, while the final section offers some 
concluding comments. 
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I. THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
I. 1. Money versus real inequality 
Although the realization that different groups are not affected in 
the same manner by the evolution of relative prices had long been 
recognized in the empirical literature(l), it appears that the idea that price 
movements should be included in intertemporal inequality comparisons 
was originally suggested by Iyengar and Bhattacharya (1965), some time 
before the path-breaking work of Atkinson (1970), Kolm (1976a,b) and Sen 
(1973) on the axiomatic foundations of inequality measurement. 
Subsequently, Muellbauer (l974a) proved that an inequality 
measure derived from a strictly quasi-concave social welfare function, 
defined over the distribution of individual indirect utility levels, is 
independent of price changes if and only if preferences are identical and 
homothetic for all consuming units. The conclusion is inescapable: if we 
do not accept such strong restrictions on individual preferences, real 
inequality comparisons will depend on the reference price vector. 
To be precise, let us start with the comparison of "income" 
distributions in two moments of time for a population with constant 
tastes consisting of H consuming units, referred to as "individuals". Let 
h 
x be the income of the h-th individual in situation t, with h = l,. ..,H and 
t 
t =1,2. Under general conditions on individual preferences 
h h h 
x =c (u ,p ) for all hand t, 
t t t 
h
where c (.) is the h-th individual cost function, p an n-dimensional 
t 
h 
vector of prices in period t, and u the maximum utility level achievable 
t 
h 
by the h-th individual in situation t. Finally, let us denote by {x } an 
t 
income distribution, consisting of H real numbers, and let 1(-) be a real 
valued index of inequality defined in the space of such distributions. 
We are interested in two empirical matters: 1) the measurement of 
changes in real inequality according to H·), in other words, in the 
expression ~R = H{u~}) - H{u~}) where the two utility distributions are 
evaluated at common prices; and 2) the distributional impact of the 
change in relative prices from PI to P2· 
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Of course, utility levels are not observable, but if individual 
preferences have been estimated we can reprice the second period utility 
distribution as follows: 
h h h 
x = C (u2 , PI)' h = 1, ... , H,21 
h
where x is the minimum total expenditure necessary for individual h to 
21 
reach the utility level u~ at prices PI' We shall denote the change in real 
inequality at prices PI by 
h h ~Rl = I({x }) - I({~ }) .21 
To evaluate the quantitative significance of the relative price changes, 
taking the utility levels achieved in period 2 as the reference standards of 
living, one may use the expression 
h h ~P21 = I({x }) - I({x })·2 21
Alternatively, we can reprice the period 1 utility distribution at 
prices P2 and define the change in real inequality by 
h h~R2= I({"2 }) - I({x })·12
Then, the change in inequality attributable to the change of prices from PI 
to P2' taking as reference the utility levels achieved in period 1, will be 
given by 
h h ~p12 = I({\2}) - I({~ }) . 
As a matter of fact, if we know the prices at other time periods, we 
can estimate the change in real inequality at prices Pt by means of 
h h ~Rt = I({x }) - I({x }) ,
2t lt
h h h (2)
where x = c (u ,p), 't = 1,2 . 
'tt 't t 
Quite apart from the interest of verifying whether our empirical 
conclusions are robust to the time period used, that is, whether we obtain 
similar values for ~Rl' ~R2 and ~Rt, we can estimate the distributional 
impact of price changes at time periods within or outside the original 
interval [1,2] by means of 
h h ~p It =I({x }) - I( (Xl })
lt
h h
and ~P2t = I({"2}) - I({x })2t
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which measure the change in inequality attributable to the change of 
prices from Pl (or P2) to Pt, taking as reference the utility distributions of 
( periods 1 (or 2), respectively. 
If we define the change in money inequality by 
h h~M =I({~ }) - I({"l }), 
c it is clear that 
~M =~P21 + ~1 =~P12 + ~Rz =~P1t + ~2t + ~Rt for all t ~ t. 
Let us agree that, in an intertemporal context, we would prefer that 
c real inequality goes down, that is to say, that ~Rt < 0 for all t. On the other 
hand, let us presume that we would rather have relative prices evolving 
over time in a manner more favorable (or less unfavorable) for the poor 
than the rich. Assume that individual true cost-of-living indexes indicate 
that the price level keeps rising over time for all consumers, and consider 
( first the case in which 1 < t < 2. Then 
h h h h h h 
xl = C (ul ' P1) < \ t =c (ul ' Pt) for all h. 
But if Pt is less damaging to the poor, the increase in the minimum total 
c 
expenditure necessary to sustain u~ will be greater for the rich than for the 
h 
poor. Consequently, the inequality of the distribution {x } will be greater
1t 
c than for the distribution {x~}, and hence ~P1t will be positive. Similarly, 
we would have that 
h h h h h h 
x2 =c (u2 ' P2) > x =c (~' Pt) for all h, 2t 
c but more so for the rich, so that the inequality of the distribution {~} will 
h 
be greater than that of {x }, and hence AP2t will be positive too. For 
2t 
analogous normative reasons, in the two limiting cases in which t =1 or 2, 
we would prefer to have ~P21 > 0, and ~p 12 > 0, respectively. Finally, 
notice that if 1 < 2 < t, we would rather have ~P1t > 0 but AP2t < 0, while if 
t < 1< 2 it would be ~P1t < 0 and AP2t > o. 
In all cases, since the desired sign of at least one of the price terms 
and the real inequality component go in the opposite direction, we cannot 
envision a prefered sign for AM: changes in money inequality are not a 
good indicator of whether the situation is improving or not from a 
normative point of view. In an intertemporal context the decomposition 
we have discussed is unavoidable. 
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I. 2. Household composition effects 
In the seminal paper already quoted, Muellbauer (l974a) observed 
that the usual conditions of S-concavity and symmetry (or anonimity) of 
the social welfare function, made sense only in a society of consuming 
units with identical needs. Then he went on to suggest a simultaneous 
treatment of the effects on inequality of both price and household 
composition structures in the context of index number theory and the 
duality approach to consumer demand, to whose development he was 
contributing so much at that time(3). 
As long as we want to take into account the demographic 
heterogeneity of any society, we must confront two issues: what is the unit 
of analysis, that is, what do we mean by "individuals"; and how do we 
deal with the fact that they have equity relevant non-income related 
different needs, that is, how do we make them comparable in "income" 
space. 
As far as the first problem is concerned, the choice is among the 
household, the family, or the person. There is no question that the level 
and trend of inequality, and the ranking of specific groups, depend 
crucially on this decision(4). Following the generally accepted practice, we 
recommend the person for two types of reasons. Firstly, according to the 
individualistic position of the profession in moral matters, it is the 
economic welfare of each person in society that should count. Secondly, 
Western societies, Spain included, are witnessing a process of growth of 
independent living arrangements which results from a long-established 
movement from the extended to the nuclear family and, at different 
speeds, a more recent trend toward the splitting of the nuclear family 
itself. Any analysis which does not take the person as the unit, would tend 
to obscure these changes. Thus, no other alternative will be pursued here. 
However, expenditure data comes typically aggregated at the level 
of the household, and even when we have information on personal 
incomes we have to contend with non earners. There is evidence that 
inequalities inside the household are empirically relevant(5). But, like 
most of the literature, we will accept the equal-sharing assumption, 
according to which all persons share equally from the household scale 
h 
variable x , conveniently adjusted to permit interpersonal welfare 
t 
comparisons among households of different size and composition. 
Following Muellbauer and the rest of the profession thereafter, the 
adjustment of the household income variable will be carried on by means 
of equivalence scales. For that purpose, let households be characterized by 
household income x, a vector a in a set A of demographic characteristics, 
and a set of so-called unconditional preferences for commodities and 
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( characteristics. If we let ch(u, p, a) be the corresponding unconditional cost 
function, the equivalence scales for household h are defined by 
h r h h rd (a,a ;u,p)=c (u,p,a)/c (u,p,a), 
which gives the cost of attaining a utility level u at prices p by a household 
c of characteristics a, relative to the cost of attaining this utility at those 
prices by a reference household of characteristics ar. The function dhO 
provides the numbers with which one would deflate the income 
distribution in order to adjust it to a needs-corrected basis, according to 
this household's unconditional preferences. As Pollak and Wales (1979) c 
and Pollak (1991) insist, we are still lacking a theory of interpersonal 
welfare comparisons in the presence of several unconditional preferences. 
But then, whose preferences should be selected for the income 
adjustment? 
These difficulties are usually dealt with assuming the existence of 
an unconditional preference ordering common to all consuming units. 
That is, 
h r r .d (a, a ; u, p) = d(a, a ; u, p) for all h = l,. ..,H. 
Armed with this single deflator we can construct the distribution of 
ir 
adjusted or equivalent income per person {z }, where, for each person i in 
tt 
household h, 
( ir h h r h h r 
z = x / d(a ,a; u ,p) = c(u ,p, a ). 
tt 'tt 't t t 
This means that each person i in period t is assigned the income that a 
household of characteristics ar would need, at prices p , to achieve the
c t 
h
utility level u attained in period t by the household to whom the person 
't 
belongs. 
,-
/ . 
Having selected an equivalence scale d(·) and a reference type l, 
let us define the change in money inequality for a pair of distributions of 
equivalent income per person by 
dM(d(.), l) = I({zirn_I({zirn. 2 1 
If we define the corresponding change in real inequality and the price 
effects for any year t in the obvious manner, we will have as before 
r r r rdM(d(·), a ) = dPlt(d(.), a ) + dP2t(d(.), a ) + dRt(d(.), a ). 
Exactly as in price space, we must face an index number problem: for each 
c reference type we will have a different decomposition of this sort. Clearly, 
to avoid this problem we must have 
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r rd(a, a ; u, p) = d(a, a ; p) for all u. 
In this case, J 
r' r r' rd(a, a ; p) = d(a, a ; p) d(a ,a; p), 
and for all 't and t 
ir' ir r' r ir 
I({z })=I({z /d(a ,a;p)})=I({z })
'tt 'tt 'tt 
if the inequality measure is scale invariant<6>. 
Finally, given an equivalence scale d(·) and a reference type l, it 
would be convenient to establish the relationship between the inequality 
h 
of unadjusted income per household, {x }, and of equivalent income per
't 
ir  
person, {z }. Let us consider, for instance, the change in money inequality, 
't 
hr 
and let us denote by {z } the distribution in which each household is 
't 
h h . 
assigned the adjusted income x / d(a ,l; p ). Then, for each 't, the change 
't 't 
,)in money inequality attributable to the change from unadjusted to 
equivalent income will be denoted by 
hr h 
~EQ't = I({z }) -I({x }),
't 't 
)and the variation attributable to the change in the unit of analysis from 
the household to the person by 
ir hr 
~UA't = I({z }) - I({z D. 
't 't 
It is clear that J 
h h~M = I({~ }) -I({') }) 
h hr ] hr ir ] ir ir 
= [I({x.. }) -I({z }) +[I({z }) -I({z }) + [I({z }) -I({z })] + 
"L. 2 2 2 2 1 ) 
[ I({zir}) _I({zhr})] + [I({zhr}) - I({x?})] 
1 1 1 1 
r 
= - ~EQ2 - 6UA2 + 6M(d(·), a ) + 6EQl + 6UAl. 
, 
j 
) 
8 
----------------
c 
( 
I. 3. The social welfare aspects of the exercise 
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One of the main features of Sen (1976)'s review of the field of real 
national income measurement, was the explicit recognition of the 
difficulties of interpretation entailed in comparisons involving different 
groups of people at two moments in time and/or two points in space. This 
is indeed a harder question than the usual comparison of alternative 
positions faced by the same population as in traditional welfare 
economics, social choice theory or the standard theory of national 
planning. 
To begin with, suppose one is trying to compare the income 
distributions of two communities of the same size. In the present context 
of intertemporal comparisons for a single country, there is less reason for 
requiring two different set of value judgements. Thus, in spite of Sen's 
remark that "a community of Benthamites may turn Rawlsian", we will 
assume the stationarity of social judgements underlying specific inequality 
measures. 
According to Sen, there are two types of questions to be raised in 
making intertemporal real income comparisons, which we apply here to 
inequality judgements. The first one is: 'Is Spain better off with the 
inequality exhibited by the 1980-81 distribution than it would have been 
with the one exhibited by the 1973-74 distribution at constant prices?' The 
difficulty lies in interpreting the meaning of the Spanish 1980-81 
community getting the 1973-74 income distribution, a problem even more 
acute when dealing with two different communities. We have to admit 
that we don't have a clear way to establish a correspondence between the 
Spaniards at the two moments in time out of the S! different one-to-one 
correspondences between two groups of S persons each. This is one reason 
why it is helpful to investigate a number of relevant partitions, each 
entailing a particular way of aggregating individuals into a tractable 
number of types for which a natural correspondence between the two 
dates can be proposed. 
The second question would be: 'Is Spain better off in 1980-81 than 
it was in 1973-74?' This is a harder issue, for which the constancy of the 
underlying indifference map is quite insufficient for a meaningful answer. 
In our case, the analysis of inequality would have to be completed with 
efficiency considerations. Also, as we shall see, any empirical 
especification of the "income" variable will manifest a variety of 
shortcomings as a measure of the economic position of the people. As 
pointed out by Muellbauer (1974a), it will typically ignore utility and 
disutility aspects from work and leisure, or intergenerational issues not 
apparent from two cross-sections of the same population. Besides, as Sen 
also notices, there are non economic dimensions pertaining to welfare 
comparisons which could have changed between periods 1 and 2 without 
affecting the social preference map defined over income distributions -for 
example, the degree of participation in decision making. But this, of 
9 
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course, escapes for the moment from even the richest conceptual 
framework at our disposal. 
On the other hand, when the two populations differ in size we 
must face an additional difficulty of interpretation. The way out 
sanctioned by professional practice, is to accept an axiom which makes 
inequality measurement invariant to identical replicas of the population. 
In intertemporal comparisons for the same country with large size 
samples, this final difficulty does not seem to be the more damaging to the 
standard procedures we will be following here. 
In view of the above, the properties characterizing the different 
inequality measures in applied work, are best seen as a purely personal 
expression of some values concerning society. But which other properties 
should they posessed? There are several criteria about the meaning of 
inequality that almost all types of approaches in the literature have in 
common. Together with the invariance to identical replicas of the 
population, these are a condition on symmetry, scale-invariance and the 
Pigou-Dalton Principle of Transfers as captured by S-convexity. 
As it is well known(7), these four properties completely 
characterize the usual Lorenz quasi-ordering. Also, since we will be 
~ \ 
)examining different partitions of the population, it will be convenient to 
work with additively separable indicators. But combined with the rest of 
the axioms already mentioned, this last assumption has drastic 
implications(B): the class of relative inequality measures gets reduced to 
the following parametric specification, known as the Generalized Entropy )family of indices of relative inequality: 
I = (l/H) (l / c2 - c) Lh (zh/ Il(zh)c - 1}, c :I' 0, 1;c 
10 = (l/H) Lh log(Il(zh) / zh} ; 
11 = (l/H) Lh (zh/Il(zh)} log{zh /Il(zh)} , 
where 110 is the mean of the distribution, 11 is the Theil index, 10 is the 
mean logarithmic deviation, and the larger and more positive (the more 
negative) c is, the more sensitive the measure Ic is to income differences at 
the top (bottom) of the distribution. 
) 
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11. STATISTICAL PROCEDURES AND EMPIRICAL IMPLEMENTATION 
Given data on the distributions of household net expenditures and 
demographic characteristics for a population in two moments of time, to 
actually obtain empirical results on the evolution of inequality one needs 
to have: 1) household specific price indices to express the original 
distributions at common prices; 2) a single set of equivalence scales to 
permit welfare comparisons of households of different size and/or 
composition. 
From the beginning of the empirical analysis of demand, some 
practitioners have always been tempted by the possibility of estimating 
equivalence scales along with the usual price and income effects. In this 
way, observed behavior, welfare and household characteristics would be 
linked in a systematic manner -a feature of the econometric approach 
which makes it appealing to many economists. 
For that purpose, one needs to assume the existence of a single 
unconditional preference ordering over commodities and demographic 
attributes, common to all consuming units. This is an assumption 
plagued with a number of well known difficulties(9), beginning with the 
normative objections raised by Fisher (1987) to the claim that equal utility 
implies equal welfare. 
Special attention should be paid to the fundamental identification 
problem -first raised by Pollak and Wales (1979)- according to which 
observed consumption patterns, conditional on demographic 
characteristics, do not permit the recovery of unconditional preferences 
over commodities and demographic attributes. As established by Blundell 
and Lewbel (1991), conditional demands determine only 'relative' 
equivalence scales, which are ratios of true cost of living indices for 
different demographic groups. Equivalence scales at a given point in time 
in a single price regime remain unidentified, although commodity 
demands serve to determine the way the scales change over time in 
response to price changes. 
The standard practice has consisted of arbitrarily selecting 
intuitively attractive assumptions about equivalence scales to narrow the 
range of possible specifications for preferences(lO). Econometrically, this 
amounts to selecting a particular cardinalization of the cost function 
which rationalizes the data on conditional commodity demands(l1). 
When they exist, the empirical implications of such a procedure are by no 
means always tested, and when they are they have been rejected(12). Other 
identification issues, which require new questionable assumptions, often 
make difficult and/or dubious the estimation of these models(13). In 
addition, the crucial assumption of a common utility function for all 
consuming units is seldom tested, and the available evidence does not 
support it(l4). A fact to be expected if, as pointed out by Pollak and Wales 
1 1 
(1979), the distribution of unconditional preferences among the 
population is not independent on the distribution of demographic 
attributes. 
Besides the usual data problems, most of these econometric 
models share still other understandable limitations which reduce their 
value for applied welfare analysis: they are static, cover only expenditures 
on private goods, and do not deal with the allocation of time within and 
outside the household. Finally, we must ask whether the normative 
conclusions on inequality measurement and their trend are unduly 
sensitive to the demand-functional form one chooses to estimate price 
and demographic effects(15), or to the specification of the function relating 
equivalence scales to characteristics(16). 
As Coulter et al. (1992a) conclude, the host of assumptions 
underlying the econometric models are not overwhelmingly persuasive, 
at least for income distribution assessment purposes. On the contrary, 
many of them rest on potentially controversial normative judgements. 
Moreover, it comes as no surprise that different assumptions lead to 
different scales. Thus, it is fair to say that there is no "correct" set of scales 
and that searching for some would possibly be misguided. 
The question is that other approaches are not convincing either, 
and do not generate robust empirical results, as documented in Buhmann 
et al. (1988) and Coulter et al. (l992a). Thus, a range of scales is not only 
inevitable but also legitimate. This is a serious problem, since thanks to 
the work of Coulter et al. (1992b), we are aware of the impact on the 
measurement of relative inequality of different views about the generosity 
of the scale. 
What is to be done? There are two immediate alternatives(l7). In 
the first place, if one insists in pooling people of different characteristics 
adjusting total household income or expenditures by means of some 
equivalence scales, then robustness should be checked by estimating 
inequality for different values of the key parameters which determine the 
scales. 
In the second place, we can always study each homogeneous 
household type separately. Following Blundell and Lewbel (1991), one 
would estimate distinct cost of living indices for each household type. 
These would suffice to construct relative equivalence scales to express the 
available money distributions at comparable money units of selected 
years in order to distinguish price from real effects on inequality 
measurement. Then, following Coulter et al. (1992a), one would only use 
measures that are additively decomposable by population subgroup to 
minimize the impact of "inappropriate" scale relativities which, under 
the assumptions that will be revised presently, will contaminate only the 
between-group component. 
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\Unfortunately, Blundell and Lewbel's suggestion is a non-trivial 
and expensive project which we may attempt at a later date. In the c 
meanwhile we thought interesting to explore the distinction between 
money and real inequality using Laspeyres type statistical price indices 
rather than true cost-of-living constructions from an explicit behavioral 
model. Of course, the main advantages of such an approximation exercise 
are that it is valid for a wide class of individual preferences, and can be c 
carried on at a relatively low computational cost while allowing for 
detailed commodity disaggregation. 
The empirical implementation of this double strategy requires the 
discussion of the following three points: (i) which is the best variable to 
represent the household's standard of living; (ii) how to compare the 
money distributions of different time periods; and (Hi) how to deal with 
the demographic heterogeneity of the population. 
(i) The scale variable 
Banks et al. (1991), in the context of a theoretical framework 
allowing a high degree of generality in the intertemporal structure of 
tastes and prices, found that single-period measures, such as income and 
consumption, will require relatively strong assumptions to act as suitable 
c indicators of a household living standard over the complete life-cycle. 
However, since we do not have appropriate life-cycle welfare measures, 
we must make a decision on the basis of the following arguments. 
On the one hand, as these authors point out, there seems to be a 
/' 
... consensus that current consumption is preferable to current income as a 
measure of the household's permanent economic position08>. On the 
other hand, budget studies are designed to provide an accurate 
measurement of all types of expenditures, while declared income is often 
seriously underreported. In particular, the expenditures of the self-
employed, those working in the agricultural sector, and the suppliers of 
the "underground" or the "irregular economy", present no special 
measurement problems, which is surely not the case for their incomes. At 
any rate, in the Spanish case, since more than 60 % of all households 
report greater expenditures than total income, until this circumstance is 
explicitly modeled we recommend concentrating all the attention on 
household total expenditure, as an estimate of private total consumption, 
rather than total income. 
In our surveys, the concept of total expenditure includes transfers 
made by the household, as well as a number of imputations for 
consumption and wages in kind, subsidized meals at work, and a market 
rental value, estimated by the owner, for owner-occupied housing. 
However, our experience with the 1980-81 EPp09> indicates that 
discontinuous household expenditures on some durables, whose 
occurrence may distort heavily the total, are best considered investment 
',. 
rather than consumption. These include current acquisitions of cars, 
I 3 
motorcycles and other means of private transportation, as well as house 
repairs financed by either tenants or owner-occupiers. Thus, our estimate 
h 
of household current consumption, x , will be total household 
't 
expenditures, net of these investment items. 
This is of course a measure of private consumption of goods and 
services, which does not include neither leisure nor the impact of the 
public sector via taxes or publicly provided goods and services. The 
possible effect on the standard of living of asset ownership or liquidity 
constraints will be absent also from the analysis. 
(ii) Repricing the scale variable 
In order to express the various expenditure distributions in 
comparable money units of the same time period, we use household 
specific Laspeyres price indices whose construction deserves some 
explanation. 
The present system of official price indices for Spain is .based on 
the year 1983. Being impossible to extend backwards this system beyond 
1978, we decided to use the previous system which has 1976 as the base 
year. Since we have monthly price data from 1976 onwards, and we know 
the quarter during which each household of the second survey was 
interviewed, it is possible to select one of them, namely Winter 1981, as 
situation 2. Unfortunately this is not the case for the first survey: we only 
have annual price data from 1960 to 1975, and we do not have 
information about the time structure of the survey during the span July 
1973 to June 1974. Therefore, the benchmark corresponding to situation 1 
will have to be the average between 1973 and 1974. Moreover, we will 
consider other time periods: 1978, within the interval (1973-74 , Winter 
81), and 1984 outside of it. 
As reported in Higuera and Ruiz-Castillo (1991), to compare a price 
vector in a given year t with the prices in the base year 1976 for a 
household h, we constructed individual indices of the type 
h h h 
I (Pt, P76 ; w ) = L' w. ·t ' 
't J J't IJ 
h 
where w, is the share of total expenditure devoted to commodity j by 
J't 
household h in the survey year 't, Ijt is the official price index for 
commodity j in year t, and j = 1, ... ,58. 
To express a given distribution -for instance the distribution {x~} of 
net total expenditures in situation 1- in money terms of a year t, we need 
individual Laspeyres type indices based on situation 1. These are easily 
constructed as follows: 
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) 
c 
( 
( 
h h h h h hL (Pt, PI; W1) = I (Pt, P76; wI )/ I (PI' P76; W1) 
where PI= (1/2) P73 + (1/2) P74 . 
Then, the repriced distribution will be 
h h h hYH = "t L (Pt, PI; w ).1 
for h = 1,..., 24.151 and t = 1978, Winter 1981, and 1984. Similarly, the 
repriced distributions for the second survey data will be 
h h h hY2t = x2 L (Pt, P2; w2 ). 
for h =1,..., 23.952, P2 =Winter 81, and t =1973-74, 1978, and 1984. 
Of course, a statistical price index provides only an upper bound 
to the true cost-of-living construction. Therefore, we will have 
h hh h hh h h 
Y = x L (Pt' P ; w ) ~ x L (Pt' P ; u ) =x 
'tt 't 't 't 't 't 't 'tt 
Hence, the nature of our approximations will depend on the substitution 
bias incurred with the use of statistical indices. In particular, if the bias is 
greater for the rich, as can be expected, then for any 't and t we will have 
h h 
I({y }) > I({x }). 
'tt 'tt 
Thus, the expressions 
h h 
= I({Y21}) -I({"t }), ~YL 
h h
and ~YU =1({~})-I({Y12}) 
will provide a lower and an upper bound, respectively, to the theoretical 
expressions ~RI' ~R2 when the latter are negative. Unfortunately, for t 
different from 't  nothing can be said a priori about the relationship 
h h 
between ~Yt = I({y )) -I({y }) and ~Rt·2t 1t 
(Hi) The treatment of differences in household size 
Having renounced to an explicit behavioral model for equivalence 
scales, how should we deal with the demographic heterogeneity of the 
population? We will follow Coulter et al. (1992b) who have studied how 
measures of inequality and poverty defined over distributions of 
equivalent income change if equivalence scale relativities are changed. 
They start from a simple characterization of equivalence scales as a 
function of household size sh and one parameter e, independent!y of 
prices and utility levels. In the notation of Section 11: 
I 5 
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dh(a, l; u, p) =d(sh, 8), 8> 0, aMs/as> O,and aM /a8 > 0,s 
where the reference type l is taken to be a household consisting of one 
adult. For tractability reasons, they accept Buhmann et al. (1988) suggestion 
of working with 
d(sh, 8) =(sh)8 , 8e [0,1] , 
because it provides a good approximation to virtually all the different 
scales currently used in empirical studies of income distribution. 
Following this approach, the objects of study will be the 
distributions (zi(8)} in which each person i receives the equivalent total 
expenditure of the household h to which she belongs, 
zi(8) =yh / (sh)8 , for all i in h, 
for several appropriate values of 8, including 8 =1 which assigns to each 
person the household per capita total expenditure. 
The main finding so far is that there is a systematic relationship 
between equivalence scale generosity and the extent of relative inequality 
and poverty. For a given income distribution, and most measures, the 
extent of equivalent income inequality and poverty first falls and then 
rises, as relativities are increased from their minimum level. Moreover 
the changes induced by changing scale relativities are considerable 
whichever measure is used. In an intertemporal context, we are only 
aware of Jenkins (1991) work on the evolution of money inequality in the 
United Kingdom, where the sensitivity of the conclusions to the scale 
generosity was systematically studied. 
Coulter et al. (1992a) second suggestion of working with measures 
that are decomposable by population subgroup in order to minimize the 
impact of "inappropriate" scale relativities, deserves some elaboration. Let 
us take the General Entropy family Ic of measures of relative inequality, 
and consider any partition of the distribution (z(8)} into (zk(8)}, k = l,. ..,K 
disjoint subgroups. Then we know that 
I (z(8» = Lk [vk(8)]c (nk)l-c I (zk(8» + I (J.l.(zk(8» =W(k) (8) + B(k)(8),
c c c c c 
where: 
vk(8) =share of aggregate equivalent income held by group k's 
members; 
nk =group k's population share, independent of 8; 
Ic(zk(8» = inequality of the distribution of equivalent income per 
person within k's group; 
J.l.(') =mean of the corresponding distribution; 
W(k)(8) = within-group component of total inequality; 
c 
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c 
( B(k)(e) = between-group component of total inequality, calculated c 
as if each person within a given group received that group's mean 
income. 
Consider the following two questions for a given partition: 1) by 
how much would total inequality go down if income differences between 
members of the partition were the only ones to exist?, or 2) by how much 
would total inequality go down if we were to eliminate income differences 
between groups, maintaining existing inequality within each of them? It is 
well known (20) that the only member of the General Entropy family for 
which this two questions have the same answer -namely, the between-
group component in the above decomposition- is the mean logarithmic 
deviation. 
In the particular case in which the population gets partitioned by 
household size into j = 1,...,J groups, we will have that all persons i in a 
given group j will be assigned the equivalent income 
zi(e) = yh Ije 
of the household h to which she belongs. Therefore, since Ic(.) is an index 
of relative inequality, we will have that, for each j, 
Ic(zi(e» = Ic(zi) for all ee [0,1]. 
Nevertheless, since the terms vj(e) will still be dependent on e, in 
general the within-group component will be dependent on e also. Only in 
the case c =0, we will have 
. . (') n 
Io(z(e» = L' (nJ) Io(zh + Io(ll(zJ(e» = w J + B J (e); J o 0 
that is, only in this case using the wrong equivalence scale contaminates 
exclusively the between-group component. 
If we want to study any other partition k =1,...,K, we should apply 
the decomposability of the mean logarithmic deviation to the within-
group component of the partition by household size which, as we have 
seen, is independent of the equivalence scale. Then 
'k (j)
Io(z(e» = Ljk (nJ )Io(zjk) + Lj (nJ)Io(ll(zh), , ll(zJK» + B (e) 
o 
= W(jk) + B(k~j) + B(j)(e) 
000 
where 
W(jk) = within-group component of total inequality in the 
o 
partition by household size and the characteristic k; 
1 7 
) 
B(k~j) =demographically weighted average of the impact of 
o 
characteristic k on each of the members of the partition by household size, 
or 'true' (independent of e) between-group component of total inequality 
due to the effect of characteristic k. 
This convenient new concept is not to be confused with 
) 
(k) 1 KB (e) =Io(Jl(z (e),...,Jl(Z (e»
o 
or 
(kj) 11 1J K1 KJB (e) = Io(Jl(z ),..., Jl(z ),...,Jl(z ),..., Jl(z » 
o 
which are, respectively, the standard between-group components in the 
partitions by characteristic k and characteristics j and k simultaneously. As 
a matter of fact, it is easy to see that 
B(k~j) = B(kj)(e) _B(j)(e) = B(k)(e) + [B(j~k) - B(j)(e)], 
o 0 0 0 0 0 
where 
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Ill. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We will answer the following questions for the country as a 
whole: 1. How does the measurement of relative inequality in situations 1 
and 2 change with the variation in the two parameters e and c 
representing, respectively, the generosity of the equivalence scale and the 
aversion to inequality? 2. How does the change in money inequality vary 
with e and c? 3. How good are our lower and upper approximations to the 
change in real inequality, and how varies the relationship between money 
and real inequality as a function of e and c? 4. In particular, how can we 
explain the difference between the evolution of inequality for the 
distribution of household expenditure per household -the case e =0- and 
the evolution of inequality for the distribution of equivalent expenditure 
per person for values of e greater than O? 5. Which is the distributional 
incidence at the national level of the change in relative prices in the 
period 1973-74 to 1984? 
6. The next question has to do with the evolution of money and 
real inequali ty for each household type with comparable needs in the 
partition by household size. For other partitions into Autonomous 
Communities, municipality size, and educational attainment of the 
household head, the questions will be: 7. Which particular groups gain 
and loose in money and real inequality for different values of c and e? 8. 
Which partition explains better total inequality in both survey years, that 
is, which partition generates a larger between-group component in the 
two situations? 
1. For the two surveys, Table 1 shows the distribution of persons by 
household size, as well as mean total expenditure for each group relative 
to the mean. The parameter e, representing the weight given to 
household size, takes on the values considered in Buchman et al.(l988): 
0.00, 0.25, 0.36, 0.55, 0.72, and 1.00. Moreover, we have considered the so-
called Oxford equivalence scale, widely used internationally, including the 
Spanish INE. It gives a unit weight to the first adult -a person 14 or more 
years old- 0.7 to each additional adult, and 0.5 to every person less than 14 
years old. It will be referred to by the symbol EQ. 
It is important to note that when size plays no role, that is, when 
e =0, we always use the distribution of household total expenditure per 
household. However, when e ~ 0, all estimates refer to a distribution of 
equivalent expenditure per person. In all cases we have used the 
information on blowing up factors provided by INE. Thus, ours are not 
sample estimates but blown up estimates for the total population. 
The patterns are very similar for the two situations: about 60 per 
cent of individuals live in 3-, 4- or 5-person households. Overall mean 
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TABLE 1. Mean equivalent expenditure by household size as a function of e 
) 
EPF 1973-74 
-------------------------------------._------------------------------------------._--------------------
Household Number of Mean equivalent expenditure as % of overall mean 
size pcrsonsas % 
of total pop. e= 0.00 0.25 0.36 0.55 0.72 1.00 EQ 
)
1 2.2 37.4 47.7 56.2 74.2 94.7 139.4 91.7 
2 10.9 66.8 71.7 78.2 90.6 102.7 124.6 117.3 
3 15.7 95.0 92.0 96.1 103.0 108.9 118.0 115.3 
4 23.9 112.2 101.0 102.2 103.8 104.5 104.4 106.6 
5 19.8 124.0 105.7 104.4 101.5 97.1 98.5 95.7 
6 13.2 133.8 108.9 105.3 99.0 93.1 83.0 86.8 )
7or+ 14.3 156.8 120.5 112.9 100.4 84.2 90.0 78.4 
Overall mean expo 254.608 199.722 169.491 128.330 100.645 68.319 103.879 
Cov(z, log s) / z 63.3 41.9 32.0 14.1 - 2.7 - 32.3 -11.3 
)
EPF 1980-81 
Household Numbcrof Mean equivalent expenditure as % of overall mean 
size persons as % 
of total pop. e= 0.00 0.25 0.36 0.55 0.72 1.00 EQ 
)
1 2.1 41.9 54.1 63.5 83.5 105.9 154.9 101.5 
2 11.4 70.1 76.1 82.8 95.4 107.6 129.6 121.6 
3 15.1 96.1 94.3 98.2 104.6 110.2 118.5 116.1 
4 25.5 113.2 103.4 104.3 105.3 105.6 104.7 107.6 
5 20.1 122.4 105.7 104.0 100.6 97.1 90.5 94.2 
6 12.5 129.0 106.4 102.6 95.9 89.8 79.5 86.3 
7or+ 13.3 145.6 112.9 105.8 94.0 84.2 69.4 72.8 
Overall mean expo 854.082 661.107 562.887 428.522 337.645 230.871 352.469 
Cov(z, log s)/z 146.3 81.3 51.4 - 2.3 -52.7 -141.6 - 95.6 
J 
expenditure declines substantially as e increases. However, among those 
from small-sized households, mean equivalent total expenditure raises 
with e, while the reverse occurs for those from large households. These 
regularities are reflected in the normalized covariance between log 
J.household size and equivalent expenditure, which is positive at low e but 
negative at high e. This seems to confirm similar findings by Coulter et al. 
(l992b) for the U.K., and is consistent with a U-form for inequality 
measurement in a single cross-section as e varies from 0 to 1. Notice that, 
judging by equivalent expenditure means, the Oxford scale seems to be ) i 
located somewhere in the interval e =[0.72,1]. 
Table 2 presents information on inequality at the national level for 
the following members of the General Entropy family: the first Theil 
measure (c = 1), the mean logarithmic deviation (c =0), a top-sensitive I J 
20 
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TABLE 2. How relative inequality varies as the aversion to inequality, the equivalence 
scale generosity, and the time period change 
EPF1973-74 
----._----------------_....._._------..._----_.__._._-..........-..._-................._--_......._----
Money 
IC 
units of 8= 0.00 0.25 0.36 055 0.72 1.00 EQ 
c period 
73-74 0.2934 0.2351 0.2284 0.2249 0.2312 0.2659 0.2386 
2 1978 0.3042 0.2444 0.2378 0.2346 0.2415 0.2776 0.2489 
C Winter81 0.3172 0.2569 0.2504 0.2475 0.2550 0.2931 0.2626 
1984 0.3228 0.2618 0.2552 0.2522 0.2598 0.2984 0.2668 
73-74 0.2316 0.1833 0.1781 0.1740 0.1763 0.1932 0.1802 
1 1978 0.2380 0.1889 0.1837 0.1797 0.1819 0.1989 0.1855 
( 
Winter81 0.2457 0.1967 0.1916 0.1879 0.1915 0.2082 0.1943 
\.., 1984 0.2493 0.1999 0.1948 0.1911 0.1936 0.2111 0.1969 
73-74 0.2498 0.1842 0.1775 0.1713 0.1717 0.1851 0.1746 
0 1978 0.2570 0.1899 0.1832 0.1769 0.1772 0.1905 0.1797 
Winter81 0.2642 0.1970 0.1904 0.1844 0.1849 0.1986 0.1875 
1984 0.2675 0.1999 0.1933 0.1872 0.1876 0.2010 0.1897C 
73-74 0.3930 0.2410 0.2268 0.2124 0.2094 0.2248 0.2121 
-1 1978 0.4095 0.2507 0.2361 0.2211 0.2178 0.2329 0.2200 
Winter81 0.4195 0.2596 0.2450 0.2301 0.2270 0.2427 0.2292 
1984 0.4253 0.2637 0.2489 0.2336 0.2304 0.2458 0.2321 
C --------------------------------------------------------------- .. _----
EPF 1980-81 
73-74 0.2141 0.1694 0.1656 0.1656 0.1737 0.2081 0.1877 
2 1978 0.2211 0.1756 0.1717 0.1717 0.1798 0.2144 0.1938 
C Winter81 0.2279 0.1823 0.1786 0.1790 0.1877 0.2238 0.2018 
1984 0.2344 0.1877 0.1839 0.1841 0.1926 0.2284 0.2063 
73·74 0.1857 0.1455 0.1419 0.1405 0.1447 0.1646 0.1543 
1 1978 0.1907 0.1502 0.1466 0.1451 0.1493 0.1690 0.1587 
Winter81 0.1950 0.1545 0.1511 0.1498 0.1543 0.1744 0.1636( 
1984 0.1997 0.1586 0.1550 0.1536 0.1578 0.1776 0.1668 
73-74 0.2024 0.1497 0.1450 0.1418 0.1447 0.1619 0.1536 
0 1978 0.2080 0.1547 0.1499 0.1467 0.1495 0.1665 0.1582 
Winter81 0.2119 0.1586 0.1539 0.1509 0.1538 0.1712 0.1625 
,(" 1984 0.2168 0.1626 0.1578 0.1546 0.1573 0.1743 0.1657 
73-74 0.2948 0.1899 0.1806 0.1730 0.1750 0.1965 0.1866 
-1 1978 0.3061 0.1979 0.1884 0.1805 0.1824 0.2040 0.1940 
Winter81 0.3104 0.2021 0.1926 0.1849 0.1870 0.2090 0.1985 
1984 0.3190 0.2082 0.1984 0.1903 0.1921 0.2138 0.2033C 
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measure (c = 2) -which is half the square of the coefficient of variation-
and a bottom-sensitive measure (c = -1). Each of the two distributions is 
expressed in money units of situation 1 (1973-74), situation 2 (Winter of 
1981), as well as the additional time periods 1978 and 1984. 
Figure 1 graphs how inequality varies with e and c when both 
distributions are expressed at the prices of their respective time periods, 
that is, in money units of 1973-74 and Winter of 1981, respectively. 
EPF 73-74 EPF 80-81 
0,29 • 0,29 I 
0,24 /. ~-;'C=2• 
_I •
--.'------. 
0,24 
<> c=l 
0,19 , <> 0,19 ~ _./0.-._ _---
.... •_--- I:>00() - - - -.0 .. - - -<> 
" .--
'<> - - - ..<>- -- -<> .. -- -<> .. ,
0,14 +--+---1---1---+---1 0,14 +--+--+--+---+---1 I 
-Io 0,25 0,36 0,55 0,72 1 o 0,25 0,36 0,55 0,72 
)!1 
EPF 73-74 EPF 80-81 
)0,44 0,44 
0,365 0,365 
C=-l 
0,29 0,29 )X X,c=O~ 0,215 Xo:::tS-~:::	 0,14 J··....f.... ~ _:,._--~ ..-...~ 
o 0,25 0,36 0,55 0,72 1 o 0,25 0,36 0,55 0,72 1 J 
Figure 1 
It appears that, for both surveys, a V-form is more pronounced for 
higher values of c. However, when we compute the range for each c as 
[(max/min) - 1] lOO, excluding either the polar case e =0 or both e =0 and 
1, we obtain: 
) 
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( 
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( 
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Range of variation in percentage terms. 
c= 2 0 -1 
EPF 1973-74: 
e E [0.25,1] 18.2 11.0 8.1 15.1 
e E [0.25,0.72] 6.1 5.3 7.5 15.1 
EPF 1980-81: 
e E [0.25,1] 25.3 16.4 13.4 13.0 
e E [0.25,0.72] 13.0 9.2 7.7 9.3 
All of these values are rather large and, as a matter of fact, greater than the 
ones reported in Coulter et al. (1992b) for c = 1 and O. When we restrict 
ourselves to the per person distributions, in both surveys the maximum 
inequality value is reached at c =2 and a =1, and the minimum at c = 0 
and a = 0.55. The ranges of variation across all values of care 55.2 % and 
48.1 % for 1973-74 and 1980-81, respectively. 
Finally, notice that the inequality estimates for the Oxford scale are 
again within those of the interval [0.72, 1] for 8, but much closer to the 
lower bound in 1973-74 and to the upper bound in 1980-81. 
2. Figure 1 illustrates another important fact: for all values of c, the 
curve showing inequality in situation 2 is below the one in situation 1. 
That is, as we knew from other studies money inequality has improved in 
Spain during this period, or ~M(8) < 0 for all a, independently of the 
inequality index used. In order to work with positive numbers, numerical 
estimates of 
i i i i 
- ~M(8)/I(z (8» = - [I(z (8» - I(z (8))]/I(z (8»
1 2 1 1 
for selected values of 8 are provided in Table 3 under the heading ~M. For 
all values of c, the improvement in money inequality decreases 
continuously as we keep giving more weight to household size. This effect 
is more pronounced as we decrease c. Thus, in the case c =- 1, ~M falls by 
more than 50 % as 8 varies in the interval [0.25, 1]. 
The range of variation is large: for per person distributions, the 
maximum value of ~M is 22.5 %, reached when c =2 and a =0.25, while 
the minimum is 7 % for c = -1 and a =1. For the important case c =0, the 
change in money inequality when a =0.25 or EQ, for example, is 12.0 % 
and 6.9 %, respectively. 
3. The change in money inequality has a very limited interest in 
itself. What matters is the change in real inequality and the distributional 
role of changes in relative prices at different dates. Because of the index 
number problem, we know that the change in real inequality at situation 1 
23 
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TABLE 3. Percentage change of money and real inequality, relative to inequality in 1973-
74, as the parameters c and E> change 
J 
e= 0.00 0.25 0.55 1.00 EQ 
2 
.1M 
~YL 
.1YU 
(.1YU • ~ YL)/~YL 
22.3 
27.0 
30.4 
12.6 
22.5 
28.0 
31.8 
13.6 
20.4 
26.4 
30.5 
15.5 
15.8 
21.7 
26.0 
19.8 
15.4 
21.3 
25.5 
19.7 
)' 
~YL/.1M 
.1YU/.1M 
(.1YU· ~ YL)/.1M 
1.211 
1.363 
15.2 
1.244 
1.413 
16.9 
1.294 
1.494 
20.0 
1.373 
1.645 
27.2 
1.383 
1.656 
27.3 ) 
1 
.1M 
~YL 
.1YU 
(.1YU· ~YL)/~ YL 
15.8 
19.8 
21.9 
10.6 
15.7 
20.6 
23.0 
17.5 
13.9 
19.3 
21.9 
13.5 
9.7 
14.8 
17.4 
17.6 
9.2 
14.3 
17.0 
18.9 
J 
~YL/.1M 
.1YU/.1M 
(.1YU · ~YL)/.1M 
1.253 
1.386 
13.3 
1.312 
1.465 
15.3 
1.388 
1.575 
18.7 
1.526 
1.794 
26.8 
1.554 
1.848 
29.4 
) 
0 
.1M 
~YL 
.1R78 
.1R84 
.1YU 
(.1YU· ~YL)/~YL 
~YL/.1M 
.1YU/.1M 
(.1YU . ~ YL)/.1M 
15.2 
19.0 
19.6 
20.3 
21.0 
10.5 
1.250 
1.382 
13.2 
13.9 
18.7 
19.1 
20.3 
20.9 
11.8 
1.345 
1.504 
15.9 
12.0 
17.2 
17.6 
19.0 
19.6 
13.9 
1.433 
1.633 
20.0 
7.5 
12.6 
12.9 
14.5 
14.8 
17.5 
1.680 
1.973 
29.3 
6.9 
12.0 
12.3 
13.8 
14.3 
19.2 
1.739 
2.072 
33.3 
) 
) 
) 
-1 
.1M 
~YL 
.1YU 
(.1YU· ~YL) / ~ YL 
~YL/.1M 
.1YU/.1M 
(.1YU . ~ YL)/.1M 
21.0 
25.0 
27.7 
10.8 
1.190 
1.319 
12.9 
16.1 
21.2 
23.9 
12.7 
1.317 
1.484 
16.7 
12.9 
18.5 
21.3 
15.1 
1.434 
1.651 
21.7 
7.0 
12.6 
15.0 
19.5 
1.800 
2.143 
34.3 
6.4 
12.0 
14.4 
20.0 
1.875 
2.250 
38.5 
) 
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prices, ~Rl' need not be equal to the same concept at situation 2 prices,
c 
~R2' nor at other different dates, say ~Rr Nevertheless, for the sake of 
robustness we hope that all these magnitudes are not too distant in 
practice. 
We do not have a direct estimate of these concepts. Rather, we 
have performed an approximation exercise to establish a lower bound ~ YL 
for ~Rl' as well as an upper bound ~ YU for ~R2 when the theoretical 
concepts are negative. We have also estimated ~Rt for t = 1978 and 1984. 
c The results, always relative to inequality in situation 1 and expressed in 
positive figures, are also in Table 3. 
Now we should ask: how good is our approximation? To begin 
with, for all c and 8 the lower bound is always smaller than the upper 
bound. As a matter of fact, as shown by way of example only for c =0, it isc 
also always the case that 
~YL < ~R78 < ~R84 < AYU' 
with ~R78 very close to AYl' and ~R84 very close to AYU in all cases. What 
we may call the approximation error to the change in real inequality, (AYU 
. ~YL)' is roughly invariant with c, grows slowly with 8, and seems to be of 
a tolerable order of magnitude: between 10-20 % of the value of ~Yl' or 15-
35 % of the value of AM, depending on 8. 
( 
On the other hand, as can be seen in Table 3, both AYLand AY U 
decrease with 8, but less so than AM. Interestingly enough, for almost all 
values of 8 our estimates of the change in real inequality are larger for 
top-sensitive and bottom-sensitive members of the General Entropy 
family than for the mean logarithmic measure. At any rate, the central 
finding is that the improvement in real inequality during this period is 
always greater than the improvement in money inequality. 
c 
Relative to situation 1, while money inequality has improved in a range 
that goes from 7 to 22.5 %, real inequality has improved from about 13 to 
30 %. Thus, the improvement in real inequality is between 24 and 114 % 
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greater than the improvement in money inequality, depending on our 
value judgements about c and e and the approximation error in our 
estimates. In particular, when we choose the Oxford scale, real inequality 
has improved between 38 to 125 % more than money inequality, 
depending on the parameter c. 
4. Let us focus on our lower bound estimate of real inequality 
change in the distribution of total expenditure per household when c =0, 
that is 
h h ~YL (0) =IO({Y21}) - Io({') }), 
h h h h
where Y21 = X:2 L (P1' P2; w2 ) 
is our estimate of household h total expenditure in situation 2 at prices of 
situation 1. In the previous section we saw that, for any other e' > 0, 
where, for each 't, ~EQ't(e') is the change in real inequality attributable to 
the move from unadjusted to equivalent income, and ~UAt(e') is the 
variation attributable to the change in the unit of analysis from the 
household to the person. The estimates for these terms when et = 0.55 
and 1.00 are as follows: 
e' =0.55 e ' =1.00 
.-._-------------------.---.----------
~EQ1(e') -0.05711 -0.04690 
-~EQ2(e') 0.04568 0.02708 
~UA1(e') -0.02130 -0.01773 
-~UA2(e') 0.01490 0.01345 
~YL (e') -0.02953 -0.02326 
~Y L ( 0) -0.04736 -0.04736 
Observe that ~EQt(e) < 0 and ~UAt(e) < 0 for all t and e; that is, 
when we go both from unadjusted to equivalent expenditure, or from the 
household to the person, there is a reduction on measured inequality. 
However, we see that the "equivalent expenditure" effect is always greater 
in absolute terms than the "unit of analysis" effect. Also, since situation 1 
figures are always greater than those for situation 2, we have that the 
improvement in real inequality when e = 0 is greater than when e ' is 0.55 
or 1.00. 
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5. Clearly, changes in relative prices must have played a positive 
redistributive role. Recall that the decomposition of the change in money 
inequality into a real and a price effect in the two polar cases requires that 
~M =~P21 + ~Rl =~P12 + ~R2' 
where situation 1 is 1973-74 and situation 2 is Winter of 1981. Also, for 
any t ii!: 1 or 2, 
~M = = ~P1t + ~P2t + ~Rt' 
As we have seen, we have estimated this last expression for t = 1978 and 
1984 -situations 3 and 4, respectively- so that we can learn about the 
c distributional impact of relative prices along the sequence 1973-74, 1978, 
Winter 1981, and 1984. This can be done on the basis of either of the two 
budget surveys, as in Table 4 where we report on the cumulative 
sequences (~P21 - ~P23)' ~P21' (~P21 + I~P231), and ~P13' ~P12' ~P14 ' 
corresponding to the second and the first situation, respectively. Only the 
( case c = °is presented here, since the interested reader can obtain most of 
the remaining information from Table 3. 
TABLE 4. Percentage change of price effects, relative to inequality in period 1973-74 , 
as the equivalence scale parameter change. Case c=0 
( 
--------------------------------------------------------------------Impact of price changes e= 0.00 0.25 0.55 1.00 EQ 
from ]973-74 to: 
1978 L\P21 - L\P23 2.2 2.7 2.8 2.5 2.6 
L\P13 2.9 3.1 3.3 2.9 2.9 ( 
Winter-81 L\P21 3.8 4.8 5.3 5.0 5.1 
L\P12 5.8 7.0 7.6 7.3 7.4 
1984 L\P2] + IL\P231 5.8 7.0 7.3 6.7 6.9 
L\P14 7.] 8.5 9.2 8.6 8.9 
L\M 15.2 13.9 12.0 7.5 6.9 
L\P21 / L\M 0.249 0.345 0.440 0.671 0.737 
L\P12/L\M 0.381 0.501 0.636 0.969 1.070 
According to both surveys, for all values of e relative prices have 
evolved in all periods less favorably for the rich, thus contributing to 
make the improvement in real inequality greater than for money 
inequality. Price effects in all periods follow an inverted U pattern as the 
generosity of the scale increases in the interval [0,1], reaching a maximum 
at the value e =0.55. The impact is considerably greater during the shorter 
period 1978-Winter 1981: about twice as large as the initial period 1973-74 
to 1978. The positive effect is somewhat weaker during the period Winter 
1981-1984. ( 
In particular, in the decomposition of money inequality the price 
component remains in the range 4 to 7 %. Since the improvement in 
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money inequality decreases with e, the importance of price effects relative 
to ~M grows considerably: from about 30 to almost 100 % as e moves from 
oto 1. 
6. Traditionally, in applied work with a single cross-section, given 
a partition of the population by any non-income characteristic there has 
been two issues of interest: the contribution to inequality by each 
individual group, and the magnitude of the between-group component as 
a measure of the explanatory power of overall inequality by the 
characteristic in question. Since we have two cross-sections, we can also 
study the evolution of money and real inequality for each of the groups 
considered. 
In the previous section we reviewed the advantages of the mean 
logarithmic deviation as an additively decomposable measure of relative 
inequali ty. For the partition by household size, the incidence of each 
group's inequality will be measured by 1ti, the ratio of its contribution to 
within-group inequality to its own demographic weight, that is, 
1ti = [Io(zi) / w (i)] / ni . 
o 
A value of 1tj greater than 1, for instance, means that this household size 
contributes to overall inequality -corrected by the fact that within-group 
inequality is not the only source of inequality for the population as a 
whole- more than what it could be expected from its demographic 
importance. Notice, of course, that this measure is independent of e. 
Table 5 presents the empirical evidence. The main result is that, in 
both surveys, small sized households and those with 7 or more members 
register the largest contributions relative to their demographic 
importance. Four person households contribute the least to total 
inequality. 
TABLE 5. Inequality within the partition by household size. Case c =0 
EPF 1973-74 EPF 1980-81 
j jNumber (1)% (2) % 1t = (1)% (2) % 1t = 
of people ni Io(zb/w (')J (2)/(1 ) ni IO(zb/w (j) (2)/(1)
0 0 
1 22 4.5 2.04 2.1 4.1 1.96 
2 10.9 15.9 1.46 11.4 15.7 1.38 
3 15.7 14.4 0.92 15.1 15.5 1.03 
4 23.9 19.7 0.83 25.5 21.6 0.85 
5 19.8 18.0 0.91 20.1 18.1 0.90 
6 13.2 12.3 0.93 12.5 10.5 0.84 
7and+ 14.3 14.9 1.04 13.3 14.5 1.09 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
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How much of total inequality can be attributed to differences in 
household size? The standard answer to this question is in terms of the 
between-group component when c = O. Unfortunately, as we saw in the 
previous section, this statistic is contaminated by the generosity .of the 
scale one cares to choose. The evidence for our two surveys and different 
members of the General Entropy family is in Table 6. Even excluding the 
case e = 0, the percentage of total inequality attributable to differences 
between the means of the various household groups, varies widely with e 
for all selected values of c. 
TABLE 6. Between-group inequality as a percentage of overall inequality in ( the partition by household size 
c e = 0.00 0.55 1.00 EQ 
1 22.9 0.90 7.78 4.92 
EPF 1973-74 0 24.4 0.97 8.22 5.20 
-1 19.1 0.84 6.92 4.39 
1 21.3 0.86 11.8 7.75 
EPF 1980-81 0 22.4 0.87 12.3 8.01 
-1 18.3 0.72 10.3 6.93 
( Table 7 contains important evidence, independent of the 
generosity of the scale, on the decomposition of money inequality into a 
real and a price effect at prices of situations 1 and 2 for households 
classified by their size. 
TABLE 7. Change in money and real inequality within the partition by household size 
j j j iNumber of people c =1 .1M j = .1R + .1p = .1R + .1p
1 21 2 12 
1 -18.4 = -23.3 + 4.9 = -28.2 + 9.8 
2 -19.9 = -24.5 + 4.6 = -28.4 + 8.5 
3 -5.2 = -11.7 + 6.6 = -13.2 + 8.1 ( 4 -10.9 = -16.6 + 5.7 = -19.2 + 8.3 
5 -15.6 = -20.8 + 5.1 = -23.3 + 7.7 
6 -24.9 = -28.9 + 4.0 = ..32.9 + 8.0 
7and+ -11.8 = -17.5 + 5.7 = -18.9 + 7.1 
c=o 
1 -16.1 = -20.9 + 4.7 = -24.8 + 8.7 
2 -17.3 = -21.9 + 4.6 = -25.4 + 8.1 
3 - 1.8 = - 8.3 + 6.5 = - 9.7 + 7.9 
4 -10.2 = -15.7 + 5.4 = -18.2 + 8.0 
5 -13.4 = -18.5 + 5.0 = -20.8 + 7.4 
6 -20.2 = -24.6 + 4.4 = -27.8 + 7.6 
7 and + - 9.3 = -14.8 + 5.5 = -16.0 + 6.7 
c =-1 
1 -20.9 = -25.9 + 5.0 = -29.3 + 8.4 
2 -19.8 = -24.7 + 4.9 = -29.1 + 9.2 
3 3.5 = - 3.9 + 7.4 = -5.2 + 8.8 
4 -12.6 = -18.3 + 5.7 = -21.7 + 9.1 
( 5 -13.2 = -18.5 + 5.3 = -21.2 + 8.0 
6 -22.0 = -27.0 + 5.0 = -30.0 + 7.9 
7and + - 4.5 = -10.4 + 5.9 = -11.9 + 7.4 
29 
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The pattern does not change qualitatively with parameter c: except 3-
person households for the bottom sensitive measure c = -1, money 
inequality improves for all groups, but less so than real inequality. From 
this point of view, the evidence for the progressive role played by relative 
prices over this period is overwhelming. 
Nevertheless, the improvement in real inequality is not the same )for all groups: in absolute terms, 1-, 2- and 6-person households, which I 
represent about 26 % of the population, experience improvements of more 
than 20 % relative to inequality in 1973-74. The important group of 3-
person households experience the minimum improvement, 4-12 %. 
However, the size of the price effect appears to be of the same order of 
)magnitude for all groups, in the range of 5-9 %, depending on whether we 
take the lower or the upper estimate and on the value of c. 
7. When inequality is measured by the mean logarithmic 
deviation, a value greater (lower) than 1 for the expression 
1(k(8) = [I (zk(8»/W(k)(8)]/nk o o 
indicates whether group k contributes to within-group inequality more 
(less) than its demographic weight leads us to expect. The results for the 
partitions by Autonomous Communities (CCAA), the size of the 
municipality of residence (MUN), and the educational level attained by 
the household head (EDC) are presented in Table 8. 
TABLE 8. Demographic distribution and contribution to inequality by individual groups 
Case c I: 0 and e I: 0.55 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
) 
1973·74 1980·81 1973·74 1980·81 
k k k k k k k kCCAA n 1t n 1t MUN n 1t n 1t 
Andalucia 17.2 1.18 17.2 1.15 < 2.000 11.3 1.16 10.3 1.14 
Arag6n 3.3 1.23 3.2 0.98 2-10.000 20.2 1.02 19.3 1.05 
Asturias 3.0 0.85 3.0 1.06 10-50.000 23.2 0.92 21.7 0.93 
Baleares 1.7 0.93 1.7 1.17 Capitals 45.3 0.99 48.8 0.98 
Canarias 3.5 1.08 3.6 1.06 
Cantabria 1.4 0.95 1.4 0.97 
Cast.-Le6n 7.3 1.18 6.8 1.11 EDUCATION 
C.-La Mancha 4.6 1.19 4.4 1.05 Illiterate 6.5 1.33 6.3 1.34 
Catalufla 15.9 0.76 15.9 0.84 No studies 18.7 1.09 25.1 1.14 J 
C. Valenciana 9.4 0.90 9.8 0.95 Primary 60.6 0.96 48.5 0.94 
Extrcmadura 3.1 1.22 2.8 1.05 Secondary 4.9 0.93 6.7 0.91 
Galicia 7.4 0.97 7.5 1.08 High School 3.6 0.91 4.8 0.86 
Madrid 11.9 1.02 12.4 0.97 Professional 0.7 0.80 1.6 0.77 
R. Murcia 2.4 0.88 2.5 1.04 Short Collg. 2.2 0.83 3.5 0.81 
Navarra 1.3 0.77 1.4 0.85 University 2.8 0.97 3.5 0.88 
Pais Vasco 5.9 0.80 5.7 0.77 
La Rioja 0.7 0.80 0.7 0.73 
A seven year period is not long enough to observe dramatic 
..) I 
changes in the frequency distribution by Autonomous Communities and 
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municipal size. The two CastiJIas and Extremadura loose some 
population, while Comunidad Va/enciana and Madrid gain some. Also, 
rural Spain sees its demographic weight reduced by little more than 3 
percentage points in favor of Provincial capitals. In this context, the switch 
observed between the categories "No studies" and "Primary School" is 
worrisome since it has no known explanation; however, the 1980-81 
figures are closer to reality according to other statistical sources. The 
greater importance in the second survey of Short College degrees and 
University attainment levels is to be expected. 
Those individual groups for which their contribution to money 
inequality decreases over the period, must have experienced an 
improvement in real inequality and/or must have received a favorable 
impact from the change in relative prices. The full information on this 
issue for c = 0 and I, and e = 0.55 and 1.00 is in Tables A, B, and C in the 
Appendix. Table 9 presents a joint picture -including the previous results 
by household size- of an average for those two values of e in the case c =0 
for our lower bound estimate for real inequality change at situation 1 
prices. 
A number of comments are in order. In the first place, it seems that 
the approximation we have attempted is relative immune to the index 
number problem: except two cases -La Rioja and municipalities of less 
than 2.000 inhabitants- when there is an improvement in real inequality 
k kI~YLI<I~YU I, that is, our lower bound estimate for ~Rl is below the 
upper bound estimate for ~R2' Notice that when L\Rt is positive, under 
the hypothesis that the substitution bias in the statistical price indices is 
k k 
greater for the rich than the poor, ~YL and ~Y become upper and lower 
U 
bounds for ~R1 and ~R2' respectively. In those cases we observe, as 
k k 
expected, that ~YL > ~YU' At any rate, the difference between these two 
quantities is rarely greater than 2-3 percentage points, although such gap 
represents more than 20 % of the lower bound for 5 Autonomous 
Communities, one municipal size, and one educational group. 
In the second place, there is an impressive evidence in favor of an 
improvement in real inequality across all partitions: only 3 -Ba/eares, 
Asturias and Murcia- out of the 29 new groups register an increase in real 
inequality. Taking from here on the data for the case c =0, we observe that 
improvements in real inequality for a sizable part of the population are 
above 20 %, relative to inequality in situation 1: 1-, 2-, and 6-person 
households (about 26 % of the population), 4 Autonomous Communities 
-Arag6n, Extremadura, Castilla-La Mancha and Pals Vasco- representing 
more than 16 %, and all households whose head has attained a High 
3 1 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE 9. Evolution of inequality for different partitions. Case c = 0 
k k1973-74: n % .1YL 1980-81: n
2.05 1 person 30 Arag6n 
1.46 2 person Profess. 1.96 1 person 
! 
0, 1) 
')1
1.33 Illiterate 24 6 person 1.38 2 person (2, 2) 
1.23 Arag6n Extremadura 
1.22 Extremadura 23 H. School III iterate (3, 3) 
1.19 C. La Mancha 22 2 person 1.17 Baleares (4, 21 
1.18 Castilla-Le6n University 1.15 Andalucia (5, 8) 
Andalucia 21 1 person 1.14 < 2.000 (6, 9) J 
1.16 < 2.000 Sch. Collg. No studies (7, 1C 
._.-----------------.------------------ 20 C. La Mancha ----------------------------------------
1.09 No studies Pais Vasco 1.11 Cast.-Le6n (8, 7) 
1.08 Canarias 
---------------------------------- 1.09 7or+ (9, 12) 
18.5 5 person 1.08 Galicia 00, 16 
1.04 7or+ Madrid 1.06 Asturias 01, 29 ) 
1.02 Madrid La Rioja Canarias 02, 11 
2.000-10.000 
---------------------------------------- 18 Secondary 1.05 E,xtremadura 03, 5) 
0.99 Prov. capitals 16.5 Cast.-Le6n Cola Mancha 04,6: 
16 Primary 2.000-10.000 05, 13 
0.97 Galicia 15.7 4 person 1.04 R. Murcia 06,2E) 
University 14.8 7or+ 1.03 3 person (17,24 
0.96 Primary S. 14 Prov. Cap. 0.98 Arag6n (18, 4) 
0.95 Cantabria 13 Canarias Prov. Cap. (19, 15 
0.93 6pcrson 11.5 Andalucia 0.97 Cantabria (20, 19 
Balearcs < 2.000 Madrid (21, 13: 
Secondary 10.000-50.000 0.95 C. Valenciana (22,27 ) 
0.92 3 person ----------------------------------- 0.94 Primary (23, 18 
10 III itera te 0.93 10.000-50.000 (24,25: 
10.000-50.000 8.3 3 person 0.91 Sccdry.. (25,2: 
0.91 5 person 8 No studies 0.90 5 person (26,23 
High School 
0.90 C. Valenciana 7 Navarra ---------------------------------------- _J 
._----_._••-----------------.-------------- 6.5 2.000-10.000 0.88 University (27,li 
0.88 R. Murcia 4.5 Cantabria 0.86 High Sch. (28,2t 
0.85 Asturias Valencia 0.85 4 person (29,3C 
0.83 4 person 4 Catalui'la Navarra (30, 3~ 
Short Collg. 1 Ga licia 0.84 6 person (31,21 
,.._1 I0.80 Pais Vasco ---------------------------------- Catalui'la (32,3f ) , 
La Rioja + 6 R. Murcia 0.81 Sch. Collg. (33, 31 
Professional + 11 Asturias 0.77 Pais Vasco (34,32 
0.77 Navarra + 15 Baleares Profes. (35,34 
0.76 Catalufia 0.73 La Rioja (36,32 
School degree or more, which are more than 10 %. At the other extreme, a 
number of groups had improvements in real inequality below 10 %: 3-
person households (15 %), households headed by an illiterate person or 
without formal studies (24-30 %), small municipalities of 2.000 to 10.000 
inhabitants -but with the rest of rural Spain not doing much better- some 
richer Autonomous Communities -Navarra, Catalufla and Comunidad 
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Valeneiana- and some not so rich ones -Cantabria, Galieia, Mureia and 
Asturias. 
In the third place, the evidence in favor of the redistribution 
induced by changes in relative prices is conclusive: for all specifications of 
c and 8, all price effects are positive. Furthermore, as we saw for 
household size, the range of variation of, say, .1pk is small for all 
21 
partitions: Mureia, households headed by an illiterate or a person without 
studies plus Canarias, experience only a 3-3.5 % price effect, while Baleares, 
Galieia and Cataluna -which did not do particularly well in real inequality-
had an effect close to 7 %. However, the vast majority of the population -in 
fact, the whole of it when classified by municipality size- exhibits a positive 
price effect in the interval 4.3-5.6 %. 
What about money inequality? Notice that a positive price effect, 
which reflects a pro-poor change in relative prices, when added up to an 
already positive change in real inequality -as in the case of Baleares or 
Asturias- leads to an alarmingly large deterioration in money inequality, 
while added up to groups with slight reductions in real inequality may 
lead up to a misleading increase in money inequality, as in the case of 
Cataluna, Comunidad Valeneiana, illiterates or municipalities with 2.000-
10.000 inhabitants. 
Our last point is that if price effects are relatively neutral across 
groups, then the variability in money inequality is essentially due to the 
variability in real inequality. The transition from the first to the second list 
kof 1t ,S in Table 9 captures the evolution in money inequality. The last 
column in that Table informs about the rankings occupied by each group 
in terms of 1tk in 1980-81 and 1973-74, respectively. Some groups who were 
doing badly at the beginning of this period, end up appearing 9 or more 
positions below at the end of it, like Arag6n, Extremadura or Castilla-La 
Mancha. Others who were doing fine end up doing much better, like 
households headed by a person with a University degree or 6-person ones, 
or, on the contrary, end up much higher in the ranking by 7[k: 3-person 
households, Baleares, Asturias, and Mureia. Finally, some high in the 
ranking in situation 1, like 1- and 2-person households, remain equally 
high but with a much reduced contribution to overall inequality above 
their demographic weight. 
8. Recall that only when we use the mean logarithmic deviation, 
the within-group component of total inequality for the partition by 
household size is independent of the generosity of the scale. That is, 
. . (') (')(z(8)) =L ' (nJ) Io(zh + I (ll(zJ(8)) = W J + B J (8). Io oJ o 0 
For any other partition by characteristic k, we would have 
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IO(z(8» = rk (nk) I (zk(8» + IO(!l(zk(8» = W(k)(8) + B(k)(8).o o 0 ) 
Therefore, to understand the role of characteristic k = 1,...,K in explaining 
overall inequality, in the previous section we suggested the partition of 
(")
the term W J in to 
o 
C) . (
W d= rjk (nJk)Io(zjk) + rj (nj)IO(!l(zh ),..., !l(zjK» = W(jk) + Bok~j) 
where B(k~j) was called the true (independent of 8) between-group 
o 
component. ) 
(k .) (')
Thus, the expression [B ~ J /W J ]100 would provide a e-
o 0 
independent measure of the importance of such between-group 
component. The evidence is as follows: 
CCAA MUN EDC 
1973-74 12.3 12.1 24.9 
1980-81 8.5 9.1 25.2 
We observe that the explanatory power of the socioeconomic variable EDC 
:>is twice as large as the geographic characteristics CCAA and MUN which, 
in any case, appears to be decreasing during this period, as reported also by 
Bosch et al. (1989) using the measure B(k), which depends on e. To 
0 
compare these two statistics we will use the expressions ) 
m(k~j)(8) = 100 [B(k~j) /IO(z(e)] 
0 
and 
k (k)
m .(8) = 100 [B (8)!l0(z(8)]. -)
0 
The evidence is as follows: 
1973-74 1980-81 
~' e= 0.00 0.55 1.00 EQ 0.00 0.55 1.00 EQ 
.' 
CCAA 
m (k~j)(e) 12.2 11.3 11.8 8.4 7.4 7.8 
m (k)(e) 8.1 11.2 11.8 12.0 5.9 8.0 7.9 8.1 
-)MUN 
m(k~j)(e) 12.0 11.1 12.0 9.0 8.0 8.7 
m (k)(e) 9.2 11.5 11.3 12.1 6.8 8.8 8.2 8.9 
EDC 
m(k~j)(e) 24.6 22.7 24.9 25.0 22.2 24.8 ~) 
m(k)(e) 21.0 24.2 24.2 24.4 20.9 25.1 22.5 25.8 
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Once more, we observe that changes in money inequality are not a 
good indicator of changes in real terms: the improvement in real 
inequali ty between groups is of a similar order of magnitude for the three ( 
partitions; however, the pro-poor effect of prices has a noticeable 
diminishing impact on between-group inequality only for EDC. 
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We observe only a slight difference between the two. Since 
B(k~j) = B(k)(a) + [B(j~k)(a) - B(j)(a)], 
o 0 
it is clear that the expression in brackets is close to zero for all a, that is, 
the distributions where each person receives the mean of her household 
size in her Autonomous Community, say, or the mean of her household 
size in the country as a whole, exhibit very similar inequality. 
So far, we have examined a cross-section at a time. We are also 
interested in the explanatory role of the between-group component in the 
evolution of money or real inequality. Let us denote by .1 MW (j) the o 
change in the within-group component of overall money inequality for 
the partition by household size. Using the corresponding notation, the 
decomposition of this term into a real and a price effect will be 
.1 W(j) =.1 W(j) + .1 W(j) . 
M 0 RI 0 P21 0 
For any other partition by characteristic k, we will have 
.1 W(jk)+.1 B(k~j) =.1 W(jk)+.1 B(k~j).1 W(jk).1 B(k~j) 
M 0 M 0 RI 0 RI 0 + P21 0 + P21 0 
and 
This last expression provides a a-independent decomposition of the 
change in money inequality between groups into a real and a price effect. 
· W(j>'·· 1 h .R I In sItuatlon ave In percentage terms: e atlve to , we 
o 
(k~ ') (') (k~') (') (k~ ') (') [~MBo J /W ~ ]lOO = [~RIBO J /W ~ ]100+ [~P21BO J /W ~]100
 
CCAA - 4.8 = - 5.2 + 0.4 
MUN - 4.1 = - 4.7 + 0.6 
EDC - 2.6 = - 4,6 + 2.0 
i 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
Any welfare or inequality comparison of a pair of income or 
expenditure distributions at different points in time and/or space, requires 
a solution to two well known problems. The first is how to express the 
two distributions in comparable money units. The second problem arises 
because we use information on household total expenditure as the best 
proxy for a household's standard of living, but we choose the person as 
the unit of analysis. The question is how to treat the heterogeneity of a 
population consisting of persons who belong to households of different 
demographic composition and, hence, of different needs. 
The paper's aim is the evolution of relative inequality in Spain, 
making use of two large household budget surveys collected in 1973-74 
and 1980-81. The decomposition of the change in money inequality into a 
real and a price effect occupies the center of the analysis. Inequality is 
measured with the help of several members of the General Entropy family 
of additively decomposable indices of relative inequality. 
We do not work with an explicit behavioral model, in which one 
could conceivably estimate income, price and demographic effects, so as to 
construct true cost-of-living indices and equivalence scales in order to 
solve the above mentioned problems. Instead, we have attempted an 
approximation exercise which does not rely on too specific assumptions 
on individual preferences and does not require its recovery by means of 
expensive econometric procedures. 
For the first problem, we use statistical Laspeyres type price indices 
which are household specific. The two available distributions are 
expressed in common money units at the dates the samples were taken, as 
well as at other years within and outside this period. Under the 
assumption that substitution bias in statistical price indices are greater for 
the rich than for the poor, we estimate bounds for the change in real 
inequality at 1973-74 and Winter of 1981 prices. 
For the second problem, we take solely into account household 
size, and study how measured inequality varies with a parameter e which 
captures the weight one is prepared to give to household size in the 
definition of equivalent expenditure per person. We analyze the 
robustness of our conclusions on the evolution of inequality at the 
national level with changes in e for several members of the General 
Entropy family, and we contrast this approach with a study of the partition 
by household size where each group consists of households which are 
presumed to have identical needs. 
We find useful to concentrate most of the attention to the mean 
logarithmic deviation, since only for this member of the General Entropy 
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family results about the within-group component of total inequality in the 
partition by household size are not contaminated by an inappropriate 
specification of the generosity of the equivalence scale. This opens up the 
way for a treatment of other household characteristics in the explanation 
of overall inequality through their between-group component in the 
corresponding decomposition. 
A summary of empirical results should illustrate the usefulness of 
this exercise in descriptive statistics. 
1. In agreement with Coulter et al. (l992b)'s results for the U.K., we 
find that as we give more weight to household size, inequality in both 
surveys first declines and then increases until we reach the per capita 
expenditure distribution. Excluding the polar case in which size is given 
no weight, the range of variation for different specifications of the 
parameter c, which identifies members of the General Entropy family, is 5-
15 % for the 1973-74 survey and 8-13 % for the 1980-81 one. By 
appropriately choosing parameters c and 8, inequality for a single cross-
section can vary as much as 50 %. 
As we knew from previous studies, money inequality at the 
national level has improved for all specifications of c and e. However, 
such an improvement decreases continuously as we give more weight to 
household size, an effect more pronounced for high values of c, that is, for 
members of the General Entropy family more sensitive to inequality at the 
top of the distribution. Relative to inequality in situation 1, the maximum 
and minimum estimates of the improvement in money inequality are 7 % 
and 22.5 %, respectively. 
2. For all values of c and e, our lower bound estimate for the 
change in real inequality in situation 1, ~ YL' is always smaller than our 
upper bound estimate of that change at situation 2 prices, ~ Yu' This 
convenient finding is confirmed for 35 groups out of a total of 36 arising 
from the four partitions studied. On the other hand, our estimates for 1978 
and 1984 are always contained in the interval [~Y L ' ~Yu ]. The size of such 
interval is 10-20 % of ~ YL' or 15-35 % of the change in money inequality, 
depending on 8. All of which suggests that our approximation to the 
"true" change in real inequality might be appropriate. 
3. The central finding is that the improvement in real inequality is 
always greater than the improvement. in money inequality: when the 
latter achieves its minimum at 7 %, the former is 12.6-15 %; at the 
maximum of 22.5 % for money inequality, the change in real inequality is 
28.0-31.8 %. For the important case of the mean logarithmic deviation 
when c = 0, the relationship is 12 % versus 7.6-19.0 % at an intermediate 
value for e. 
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4. Here, as in many other studies, we find that as we go from 
household total expenditure per household to equivalent expenditure per 
person, relative inequality decreases. We provide an explanation in terms 
of the movement from total to equivalent expenditure, on the one hand, 
and from the household to the person, on the other hand. Both effects 
reduce measured inequality, but the first is stronger than the second. 
5. There is no doubt that changes in relative prices from 1973-74 to 
Winter of 1981 in Spain have been less damaging to the poor than to the 
rich. When c = a, as 8 varies in the interval [a, 1] money inequality 
improves by 15-7 % during this period. The proportion of this change 
explained by the price effect varies with 8 from about 30% to almost 100 %. 
Having computed also real and price effects at 1978 and 1984, we observe 
that during the intermediate period, 1978 to Winter 1981, the impact of 
price changes is greater than during the two larger periods, 1973-74 to 1978 
and Winter 1981 to 1984. 
6. The partition by household size leads to a fundamental result 
independent of the generosity of the scale: except for 3-person households 
according to a measure more sensitive to inequality at the bott9m of the 
distribution, money inequality improves for all groups, but less so than 
real inequality. At the top of the list, 1-, 2-, and 6-person households, 
which represent about 26 % of the population, experience improvements 
in real inequality of more than 20 % relative to inequality in situation 1. 
However, the size of price effects are in the range of 5-9 % for all groups. 
7. When we partition the population by other household 
characteristics, we find that for c =1 or 0 and several values of 8, only 3 out 
of 29 new groups experience a decrease in real inequality. At the same 
time, price effects always induce a pro-poor redistribution for all 
specifications. Furthermore, for the majority of the population price 
effects, from the point of view of situation 2, for example, represent 4.3-5.6 
% of inequality in 1973-74. Therefore, the variability observed in money 
inequality is essentially due to the variability in real inequality. 
8. To evaluate the importance of inequality between groups of 
different partitions, we propose a measure independent of 8. In both 
surveys, we find that the explanatory power of overall inequality provided 
by the educational level attained by the household head, is about twice as 
large as the one provided by the Autonomous Community or the size of 
the municipality where one lives: the between-group component in the 
case of the socioeconomic characteristic explains 24 % of total inequality, 
while the geographic factors explain only 8.5-12.3 % of the total. We 
observe also that there is an improvement in real inequality between 
groups of a similar order of magnitude for the three partitions, but the pro-
poor price effect is only noticeable for the education variable. 
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La Rioja 8 = 0.55 -21.2 = -26.4 + 5.2 = -30.5 + 9.3 
8 = 1.00 - 7.9 = -14.7 + 6.8 = ~12.9 + 5.0 
J 
C=o 
Andalucia 8 = 0.55 -10.7 = -15.3 + 4.6 = -17.3 + 6.6 
8=1.00 - 4.5 = - 8.8 + 4.3 = -10.5 + 6.0 
), 
Arag6n 8=0.55 -27.3 = -33.2 + 5.9 = -36.6 + 9.3 
8=1.00 -20.1 = -26.2 + 6.1 = -29.3 + 9.2 
Asturias 8=0.55 13.4 = 8.1 + 5.3 = 3.1 + 10.4 
8=1.00 21.1 = 14.6 + 5.5 = 10.2 + 9.9 ) 
Baleares 8 = 0.55 15.4 = 9.0 + 6.4 = 6.1 + 9.3 
8=1.00 29.9 = 23.2 + 6.7 = 21.1 + 8.8 
Canarias 8 = 0.55 -10.9 = -14.3 + 3.5 = -15.9 + 5.0 
8 = ].00 - 9.] = ·]3.0 + 3.8 = -]3.5 + 4.3 
) 
Cantabria 8 = 0.55 - 6.4 = -11.3 + 4.9 = -15.0 + 8.6 
8=1.00 6.9 = 2.0 + 4.9 = - 1.2 + 8.1 
Castilla-Le6n 8 =0.55 -]4.5 = -19.5 + 4.9 = -22.3 + 7.8 
8=1.00 . 9.8 = -14.3 + 4.5 = -17.2 + 7.4 
J 
C.-La Mancha 8 = 0.55 ·]9.2 = -24.4 + 5.2 = -24.4 + 5.2 
8=1.00 -10.5 = -]5.3 + 4.9 = -15.9 + 5.4 
Catalui'\a 8 = 0.55 1.1 = - 6.2 + 7.3 = - 7.7 + 8.8 
8=1.00 4.7 = - 2.2 + 6.9 = - 3.7 + 8.4 
) 
C. Valcnciana 8 = 0.55 - 3.] = - 9.3 + 6.2 = -10.8 + 7.7 
8=1.00 6.4 = 0.3 + 6.1 = - 1.2 + 7.6 
Extremadura 8 = 0.55 -2].4 = -25.7 + 4.2 = -28.3 + 6.8 
8 = ].00 -]9.36 = -22.9 + 3.6 = -26.0 + 6.7 
) 
Galicia 8 = 0.55 1.3 = - 6.0 + 7.3 = - 9.3 + 10.6 
8=1.00 10.0 = 3.2 + 6.8 = 0.0 + 10.0 
Madrid 8 = 0.55 -13.4 = ·19.2 + 5.8 = -22.4 + 9.0 
8=1.00 -12.8 = -18.1 + 5.4 = -21.2 + 8.4 
-) 
R. Murcia 8=0.55 6.9 = 3.4 + 3.5 = - 0.4 + 73 
8 = 1.00 10.9 = 83 + 2.6 = 4.2 + 6.7 
Navarra 8 = 0.55 - 0.8 = - 5.8 + 6.6 = - 7.1 + 7.9 
8=1.00 - 2.0 = - 7.9 + 5.9 = - 9.6 + 7.5 
J 
Pais Vasco 8 = 0.55 -16.0 = -21.1 + 5.1 = -24.2 + 8.2 
8=1.00 -13.9 = -18.7 + 4.8 = -22.0 + 8.1 
La Rioja 8 = 0.55 -16.5 = -22.1 + 5.7 = -22.7 + 6.2 
8 =].00 - 9.] = -]5.3 + 6.1 = -14.0 + 4.8 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE A. Change in money and real inequality within Autonomous Communities 
Andaluda 
c=l 
e=0.55 
e=1.00 
k 
~M 
-13.4 
- 6.9 
= 
= 
= 
k 
~y 
L 
-18.2 
-11.5 
+ 
+ 
+ 
k 
~p21 
4.8 
4.6 
= 
= 
= 
k 
~y 
U 
-20.5 
-13.5 
+ 
+ 
+ 
k 
~p 
12 
7.1 
6.6 
Arag6n e=0.55 
e=1.00 
-26.6 
-18.2 
= 
= 
-32.8 
-24.8 
+ 
+ 
6.2 
6.6 
= 
= 
-36.1 
-27.6 
+ 
+ 
9.4 
9.4 
Asturias e=0.55 
e = 1.00 
6.4 
13.6 
= 
= 
1.3 
8.4 
+ 
+ 
5.1 
5.2 
= 
= 
-
-
3.6 
3.8 
+ 
+ 
10.0 
9.8 
( Baleares e=0.55 
8=1.00 
20.9 
38.9 
= 
= 
13.2 
30.5 
+ 
+ 
7.7 
8.4 
= 
= 
9.4 
28.6 
+ 
+ 
11.4 
10.3 
Canarias e=0.55 
8=1.00 
- 8.0 
- 8.4 
= 
= 
-12.4 
-12.8 
+ 
+ 
4.4 
4.4 
= 
= 
-13.3 
-13.3 
+ 
+ 
5.3 
4.9 
( Cantabria 8 = 0.55 
8 = 1.00 
-18.8 
- 7.3 
= 
= 
-22.8 
-11.5 
+ 
+ 
3.9 
4.2 
= 
= 
-25.8 
-13.9 
+ 
+ 
6.9 
6.6 
CastiIla-Le6n 8 = 0.55 
8 = 1.00 
-11.1 
- 3.7 
= 
= 
-16.2 
- 8.5 
+ 
+ 
5.1 
5.0 
= 
= 
-19.4 
-11.3 
+ 
+ 
8.3 
7.6 
,/-
,. C.-La Mancha 8 = 0.55 
8 = 1.00 
-18.2 
- 7.8 
= 
= 
-23.9 
-13.0 
+ 
+ 
5.7 
5.2 
= 
= 
-24.1 
-14.1 
+ 
+ 
5.8 
6.3 
Cataluna 8= 0.55 
8 = 1.00 
- 2.6 
1.3 
= 
= 
-
-
9.7 
5.5 
+ 
+ 
7.1 
6.8 
= 
= 
-11.4 
- 7.3 
+ 
+ 
8.8 
8.6 
C. Valenciana 8= 0.55 
8 = 1.00 
- 3.9 
3.7 
= 
= 
-10.3 
-
2.4 
+ 
+ 
6.4 
6.0 
= 
= 
-11.2 
- 3.6 
+ 
+ 
7.3 
7.2 
Extremadura 8 = 0.55 
e=1.00 
-24.6 
-24.6 
= 
= 
-28.7 
-28.0 
+ 
+ 
4.1 
3.4 
= 
= 
-31.9 
-32.7 
+ 
+ 
7.3 
8.1 
Galicia e=0.55 
e=1.00 
1.9 
9.8 
= 
= 
- 5.5 
3.1 
+ 
+ 
7.4 
6.7 
= 
= 
-
-
8.9 
0.5 
+ 
+ 
10.8 
10.3 
Madrid e= 0.55 
e=1.00 
-21.2 
-19.7 
= 
= 
-26.4 
-24.5 
+ 
+ 
5.2 
4.9 
= 
= 
-30.5 
-28.5 
+ 
+ 
9.3 
8.9 
( R. Murcia e= 0.55 
e=1.00 
1.3 
4.4 
= 
= 
- 1.8 
2.4 
+ 
+ 
3.1 
2.0 
= 
= 
-
-
6.3 
2.5 
+ 
+ 
7.5 
6.9 
Navarra 8= 0.55 
8=1.00 
-12.2 
-23.6 
= 
= 
-18.0 
-28.0 
+ 
+ 
5.6 
4.5 
= 
= 
-18.1 
-28.3 
+ 
+ 
5.9 
4.7 
; Pais Vasco 8= 0.55 
8 = 1.<X) 
-18.3 
-14.3 
= 
= 
-23.3 
-19.1 
+ 
+ 
5.0 
4.8 
= 
= 
-26.7 
-22.6 
+ 
+ 
8.4 
8.3 
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( TABLE B. Change in money and real inequality within municipalities by size 
k k k k k
c=1 ~M	 = + ~P = ~y + ~P~y L 21 U 12 ) 
< 2.000 8 = 0.55 - 7.5 = -12.5 + 5.0 = -11.1 + 3.6 
8 = 1.00 2.0 = • 3.1 + 5.1 = - 1.7 + 3.8 
2.000-10.000 8= 0.55 - 6.7 = -11.9 + 5.2 = -14.4 + 7.7 
8=1.00 1.6 = - 3.2 + 4.8 = - 5.8 + 7.4 
10.000-50.000 E>= 0.55 - 9.7 = -15.2 + 5.5 = -17.5 + 7.8 
( E> = 1.00 - 6.1 = -11.1 + 5.0 = -13.4 + 7.2 
Prov. capitals 8= 0.55 -14.4 = -19.9 + 5.5 = -23.0 + 8.5 
8 = 1.00 -11.0 = -16.2 + 5.2 = -19.2 + 8.1 
C C=o 
< 2.000 8 = 0.55 -11.1 = -15.7 + 4.6 = -14.6 + 3.5 
8=1.00 • 5.0 = - 9.3 + 4.3 = - 8.6 + 3.5 
2.000-10.000 8 = 0.55 • 6.6 = -11.5 + 4.9 = -14.0 + 7.4 
(, 8=1.00 2.7 = - 2.0 + 4.6 = - 4.3 + 7.0 
10.000-50.000 8 = 0.55 - 8.4 = -13.6 + 5.2 = -15.9 + 7.5 
8=1.00 - 4.5 = - 9.3 + 4.8 = -11.4 + 7.0 
Prov. capitals 8 = 0.55 -10.2 = -15.8 + 5.6 = -18.5 + 8.3 
( 8 = 1.00 - 7.1 = -12.4 + 5.3 = -14.9 + 7.8 
, '. 
c 
4 ] 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
TABLE C. Change in money and real inequality for household head's educational levels 
i 
--------------------------------------------------------------------
J Ik k k k k
c=l AM = AY + .1P = .1Y + .1P L 21 U 12 
Illiterates 8 = 0.55 -13.4 = -16.7 + 3.3 = -18.6 + 5.2 
8=1.00 - 0.2 = - 3.1 + 2.9 = - 3.8 + 3.6 
.JNo studies 8 = 0.55 - 8.8 = -12.6 + 3.8 = -14.4 + 5.5 
8=1.00 - 2.1 = - 5.6 + 3.5 = - 7.2 + 5.1 
Primary School e = 0.55 -14.6 = -19.6 + 5.0 = -22.2 + 7.7 
e = 1.00 - 9.6 = -14.3 + 4.7 = -16.6 + 7.1 
JSecondary School 8 = 0.55 -14.8 = -19.9 + 5.1 = -22.7 + 7.9 
8= 1.00 -10.4 = -15.5 + 5.1 = -18.1 + 7.7 
High School 8 = 0.55 -22.8 = -28.0 + 5.2 = -30.3 + 7.4 
8=1.00 -25.2 = -29.1 + 3.8 = -31.8 + 6.5 
JProfessional 8 = 0.55 -22.2 = -27.8 + 5.6 = -27.9 + 5.7 
8=1.00 -31.0 = -36.5 + 5.5 = -36.8 + 5.8 
Short College 8 = 0.55 -18.0 = -22.6 + 4.6 = -26.3 + 8.3 
degree 8=1.00 -21.8 = -25.7 + 3.9 = -29.4 + 7.7 
University 8 = 0.55 -18.3 = -22.8 + 4.5 = -25.7 + 7.5 :)
8=1.00 -17.3 = -21.1 + 3.8 = -25.5 + 8.2 
C=o 
III itcra tcs 8 = 0.55 -12.1 = -15.1 + 3.0 = -17.3 + 5.2 ) 
8 = 1.00 - 0.2 = - 2.8 + 3.0 = - 3.5 + 3.7 
No studies 8 = 0.55 - 9.0 = -12.7 + 3.7 = -14.9 + 5.9 
8=1.00 - 3.0 = - 6.4 + 3.4 = - 8.3 + 5.4 
Primary School 8 = 0.55 -14.6 = -19.4 + 4.8 = -22.0 + 7.4 ..)1 
8=1.00 -10.5 = -14.9 + 4.5 = -17.4 + 6.9 I 
Secondary Sch. 8 = 0.55 -14.6 = -19.5 + 4.9 = -22.8 + 8.2 
8=1.00 -10.9 = -15.5 + 4.6 = -18.7 + 7.8 
High School 8 = 0.55 -17.8 = -22.9 + 5.1 = -25.1 + 7.4 ) 
8=1.00 -19.5 = -23.5 + 4.1 = -25.9 + 6.4 
Professional 8 = 0.55 -16.5 = -22.9 + 6.4 = -23.5 + 7.0 
8 = 1.00 -25.8 = -31.9 + 6.0 = -32.8 + 6.9 
Short College 8= 0.55 -15.3 = -20.2 + 4.9 = -23.6 + 8.4 ) 
degree 8=1.00 -17.8 = -22.0 + 4.2 = -25.3 + 7.5 
University 8 = 0.55 -21.0 = -25.1 + 4.1 = -28.5 + 7.6 
8=1.00 -17.0 = -20.5 + 3.5 = -25.0 + 8.0 
,\ I 
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utility, permit the identification of the so-called general translog 
household equivalence scales. In Jorgenson and Slesnick (1984b) measures 
of absolute and relative inequality are then derived from a social welfare 
function defined over the distribution of price-dependent indirect utility 
functions. These are estimated with 1958-78 data for the V.s.; the 
differences between any two years in these series give an estimate of the 
corresponding change in money inequality. In Slesnick (1990), two time 
series of relative inequality measures were estimated with V.S. data for 
the period 1947-85: one dependent on prices, whose rate of change 
provides again a measure of the evolution of money inequality; and 
another series estimated at constant prices with 1947 as the reference time 
period, whose rate of change provide a measure of the evolution of real 
inequality. Of course, the difference between the two series for each given 
year t provide an estimate of the impact on inequality of the change in 
prices from 1947 to the year in question. 
Also relevant for our topic, in Muellbauer (l974c) money 
expenditure distributions for 1964 and 1970 in the V.K. were simply 
adjusted for differences in household size by means of some equivalence 
scales borrowed from Stark (1972). Then, based on some estimates of the 
Linear Expenditure System of demand equations for 9 commodity groups, 
true cos t-of-li ving indices were used to express the 1970 money 
expenditure distribution for adult equivalents into 1964 prices in order to 
compute the change in real inequality between these two dates. 
Muellbauer (1974a) contains an estimate of the impact of price changes on 
inequality during the period 1970-72. 
(12) On this issue, see Blundel and Lewbel (1991) 
(13) See the discussion in Coulter at al. (1992a). 
(14) See Barnes and Gillingham (1984) and Nicol (1989). 
(15) Ray (1985) found that both the inequality estimates for 
childless couples and for couples with one child and, more disturbingly, 
their evolution over time, were highly sensitive to the two demand 
systems used. 
(16) This issue has been stressed by Browning (1991) and by 
Coulter et al. (l992a). 
(17) Coulter et a1. (1992a) mention also the "Sequential 
Dominance" approach suggested by Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987) 
which requires as a necessary condition that relative numbers of each 
different household type are the same in the distributions to be compared, 
a feature not present in our data. 
(18) On this issue, see also the discussion in Atkinson (1990). 
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NOTES 
0) For early studies on India, see Iyengar (1967) and 
Mahalanobis (1972); for U.K. studies, see Prais (1959), Nicholson (1975), 
Lesser (976) and the references quoted in Muellbauer (1974c); for the U.s., 
see Michael (970), Hollister and Palmer (972), and Hagemann (1982); and 
for Spain, see Abadia (1986a). 
(2) Alternatively, with the help of true cost-of-living indices of 
the Laspeyres type, Lh(Pt'p ; uh), we can reprice the original total money
t t 
expenditure distributions as follows 
hh h hh hh hh hh h 
x L (Pt'P;u )=c (u ,p)[c (u ,Pt)/c (u ,Pt)]=c (u ,Pt)=x . 
t t t t t t t t tt 
(3) See Muellbauer 0974b). 
(4) See, for example, Kuznets (1976), Danziger and Taussing 
(979), Johnson and Webb (1979), Datta and Meerman (980), Cowell 
( (1984), and Ruiz-Castillo (987). 
(5) See Haddad and Kambur (1990) and the references quoted 
there. 
(6) The same argument goes through for any other class of 
mean-invariant inequality measures by appropriately modifying the 
definition of the equivalence scale. 
(7) See, for example, Foster (1985). Notice that accepting the 
transfer principle when analyzing distributions of equivalent income 
implies the acceptance of a value judgement which has been questioned 
very forcefully by Cowell (1980), Jenkins and D'Higgins (1989), and Glewwe 
(1991). For a useful discussion, see Coulter et al. (1992a). 
(8) See Shorroks (1980). 
(9) For a discussion see Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) and Ruiz-
Castillo (1991), and Coulter et al. (1992a). 
( (10) Good recent examples are provided by Blackorby and 
Donaldson (19??) and Lewbel (1989), which explore the implications of 
assuming that equivalence scales are independent of utility levels. 
(11) A good example for our purposes is provided by the work of 
Jorgenson and Slesnick (1983, 1984a, 1987), where the assumption of 
independence of the scales on the utility levels, combined with conditions 
for exact aggregation in the context of the translog model of indirect 
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